Publications:
Moral Responsibility and Proper Function (forthcoming), The Journal of Philosophy.
Abstract: Existing accounts of moral responsibility struggle with cases involving agents who act wrongfully as a result of brain manipulation. In this paper, in order to better handle these sorts of cases, I propose a proper function condition on moral responsibility. The key to making this condition viable, I argue, is to expand our conception of biological functions to recognize deviations from species-typical processes of organ development as a distinct type of dysfunction. Not only does this provide us with a solution to the problem posed by manipulation cases, it also offers a unifying explanation for why a wide range of seemingly-unrelated conditions – everything from childhood abuse to heavy metal poisoning – can serve to mitigate moral responsibility. The relationship between proper function and moral responsibility, moreover, is mediated by the true self; brain dysfunctions diminish moral responsibility because they represent deviations from or distortions of the true self.
Recalibrating Evolutionary Debunking (2024), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108(2): 456-478.
Abstract: Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self-undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debunking as our moral beliefs. I argue that this objection suffers from several defects, the most serious of which is that it has the unpalatable consequence that we should never revise our moral beliefs in response to evidence that our capacity for normative cognition is globally impaired. The second objection, which comes to us from Katia Vavova, claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are doomed to fail, because they attempt to show that our moral beliefs are unreliable without making any assumptions about the nature of morality, and this is impossible. I argue, to the contrary, that the etiological higher-order evidence cited by debunking arguments can give us good reason to think that our moral beliefs are unreliable, even if we make no assumptions about what morality is like.
The Medical Model, With a Human Face (2022). Philosophical Studies 179(12): 3747-3770.
Abstract: In this paper, I defend a version of the medical model of disability, which defines a disability as an enduring biological dysfunction that causes its bearer a significant degree of impairment. We should accept the medical model, I argue, because it succeeds in capturing our judgments about what conditions do and do not qualify as disabilities, because it offers a compelling explanation for what makes a condition count as a disability, and because it justifies why the federal government should spend hundreds of billions of dollars, annually, on aid and accommodations for disabled people. After responding to a pair of objections Elizabeth Barnes has raised against the medical model, I contrast it with Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu's welfarist account of disability, and with Barnes's own mere-difference view. Both of these accounts face serious challenges, although elements of Barnes's view can – and, in my opinion, should – be adopted by proponents of the medical model.
The Epistemology of Evolutionary Debunking (2021). Synthese 199(5-6): 12155-12176.
Abstract: Fifteen years ago, Sharon Street and Richard Joyce advanced evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism, which purported to show that the evolutionary history of our moral beliefs makes moral realism untenable. These arguments have since given rise to a flurry of objections; the epistemic principles Street and Joyce relied upon, in particular, have come in for a number of serious challenges. My goal in this paper is to develop a new account of evolutionary debunking which avoids the pitfalls Street and Joyce encountered and responds to the most pressing objections they faced. I begin by presenting a striking thought experiment to serve as an analogy for the evolution of morality; I then show why calibrationist views of higher-order evidence are crucial to the evolutionary debunking project; I outline a new rationale for why finding out that morality was selected to promote cooperation suggests that our moral judgments are unreliable; and I explain why evolutionary debunking arguments do not depend on our having a dedicated faculty for moral cognition. All things considered, I argue, evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism are on relatively secure footing – provided, at least, that we accept a calibrationist account of higher-order evidence.
Options Must Be External (2020). Philosophical Studies 177(5): 1175-1189.
Abstract: Brian Hedden has proposed that any successful account of options for the subjective “ought” must satisfy two constraints: first, it must ensure that we are able to carry out each of the options available to us, and second, it should guarantee that the set of options available to us supervenes on our mental states. In this paper I show that, due to the ever-present possibility of Frankfurt-style cases, these two constraints jointly entail that no agent has any options at any time. This consequence, however, is clearly unacceptable, so one of Hedden’s constraints must go. Because the ability constraint is indispensable, I argue, we have no choice but to reject the supervenience constraint. Hedden’s underlying motivation for imposing the supervenience constraint is the conviction that our options should be transparent to us, but transparency also proves to be incompatible with the ability constraint, so it must be rejected as well. I conclude by sketching an unabashedly externalist account of options, which conceives of them as exhaustive combinations of atomic movements.
Works in progress:
Titles in this section are redacted to protect blind review. Contact me for drafts.
–Paper on moral anti-realism. Under review.
–Paper on calibrationism. In progress.
–Paper on the relationship between science and moral realism. In progress.
–Paper on evolutionary debunking arguments. In progress.
Moral Responsibility and Proper Function (forthcoming), The Journal of Philosophy.
Abstract: Existing accounts of moral responsibility struggle with cases involving agents who act wrongfully as a result of brain manipulation. In this paper, in order to better handle these sorts of cases, I propose a proper function condition on moral responsibility. The key to making this condition viable, I argue, is to expand our conception of biological functions to recognize deviations from species-typical processes of organ development as a distinct type of dysfunction. Not only does this provide us with a solution to the problem posed by manipulation cases, it also offers a unifying explanation for why a wide range of seemingly-unrelated conditions – everything from childhood abuse to heavy metal poisoning – can serve to mitigate moral responsibility. The relationship between proper function and moral responsibility, moreover, is mediated by the true self; brain dysfunctions diminish moral responsibility because they represent deviations from or distortions of the true self.
Recalibrating Evolutionary Debunking (2024), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108(2): 456-478.
Abstract: Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self-undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debunking as our moral beliefs. I argue that this objection suffers from several defects, the most serious of which is that it has the unpalatable consequence that we should never revise our moral beliefs in response to evidence that our capacity for normative cognition is globally impaired. The second objection, which comes to us from Katia Vavova, claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are doomed to fail, because they attempt to show that our moral beliefs are unreliable without making any assumptions about the nature of morality, and this is impossible. I argue, to the contrary, that the etiological higher-order evidence cited by debunking arguments can give us good reason to think that our moral beliefs are unreliable, even if we make no assumptions about what morality is like.
The Medical Model, With a Human Face (2022). Philosophical Studies 179(12): 3747-3770.
Abstract: In this paper, I defend a version of the medical model of disability, which defines a disability as an enduring biological dysfunction that causes its bearer a significant degree of impairment. We should accept the medical model, I argue, because it succeeds in capturing our judgments about what conditions do and do not qualify as disabilities, because it offers a compelling explanation for what makes a condition count as a disability, and because it justifies why the federal government should spend hundreds of billions of dollars, annually, on aid and accommodations for disabled people. After responding to a pair of objections Elizabeth Barnes has raised against the medical model, I contrast it with Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu's welfarist account of disability, and with Barnes's own mere-difference view. Both of these accounts face serious challenges, although elements of Barnes's view can – and, in my opinion, should – be adopted by proponents of the medical model.
The Epistemology of Evolutionary Debunking (2021). Synthese 199(5-6): 12155-12176.
Abstract: Fifteen years ago, Sharon Street and Richard Joyce advanced evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism, which purported to show that the evolutionary history of our moral beliefs makes moral realism untenable. These arguments have since given rise to a flurry of objections; the epistemic principles Street and Joyce relied upon, in particular, have come in for a number of serious challenges. My goal in this paper is to develop a new account of evolutionary debunking which avoids the pitfalls Street and Joyce encountered and responds to the most pressing objections they faced. I begin by presenting a striking thought experiment to serve as an analogy for the evolution of morality; I then show why calibrationist views of higher-order evidence are crucial to the evolutionary debunking project; I outline a new rationale for why finding out that morality was selected to promote cooperation suggests that our moral judgments are unreliable; and I explain why evolutionary debunking arguments do not depend on our having a dedicated faculty for moral cognition. All things considered, I argue, evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism are on relatively secure footing – provided, at least, that we accept a calibrationist account of higher-order evidence.
Options Must Be External (2020). Philosophical Studies 177(5): 1175-1189.
Abstract: Brian Hedden has proposed that any successful account of options for the subjective “ought” must satisfy two constraints: first, it must ensure that we are able to carry out each of the options available to us, and second, it should guarantee that the set of options available to us supervenes on our mental states. In this paper I show that, due to the ever-present possibility of Frankfurt-style cases, these two constraints jointly entail that no agent has any options at any time. This consequence, however, is clearly unacceptable, so one of Hedden’s constraints must go. Because the ability constraint is indispensable, I argue, we have no choice but to reject the supervenience constraint. Hedden’s underlying motivation for imposing the supervenience constraint is the conviction that our options should be transparent to us, but transparency also proves to be incompatible with the ability constraint, so it must be rejected as well. I conclude by sketching an unabashedly externalist account of options, which conceives of them as exhaustive combinations of atomic movements.
Works in progress:
Titles in this section are redacted to protect blind review. Contact me for drafts.
–Paper on moral anti-realism. Under review.
–Paper on calibrationism. In progress.
–Paper on the relationship between science and moral realism. In progress.
–Paper on evolutionary debunking arguments. In progress.